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In a few short years, the World Wide Web has become a standard part of candidates’
campaign tool kits. Virtually all candidates have their own sites, and voters, journalists,
and activists visit the sites with increasing frequency. In this article, we study what
candidates do on these sites—in terms of the information they present—by exploring
one of the most enduring and widely debated campaign strategies: “going negative.”
Comparing data from over 700 congressional candidate Web sites, over three election
cycles (2002, 2004, and 2006), with television advertising data, we show that candidates go negative with similar likelihoods across these media. We also find that while
similar dynamics drive negativity on the Web and in television advertising, there are
some notable differences. These differences likely stem, in part, from the truncated
sample available with television data (i.e., many candidates do not produce ads). Our
results have implications for understanding negative campaigning and for the ways in
which scholars can study campaign dynamics.
Keywords campaigns, internet, negative campaigning, candidate Web sites, new media

There is little doubt that the Internet has transformed the way citizens interact with one
another and with ruling elites. Yet, the speedy profusion of the Internet leaves the exact
nature of its political impact uncertain. Scholars and pundits regularly disagree, for example,
on how the Internet affects polarization, deliberation, and targeted marketing. Also unclear is
whether the content of political communications on the Internet differs from what is found in
more traditional media. This uncertainly stems, in large part, from the fact that “data on the
production of political content online are difficult to come by” (Howard, 2006, p. 26). In this
article, we explore political communication online by focusing on one of the most enduring
and widely debated types of rhetoric: negativity. We are particularly interested in how and
why candidates might be using the Web as a new venue for confronting their opponents—a
venue that seems to offer some unprecedented opportunities for going negative.
James N. Druckman is Payson S. Wild Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. Martin J. Kifer is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Director of Survey Research at
High Point University. Michael Parkin is Assistant Professor of Politics at Oberlin College.
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We explore negative campaigning on the Web with data from a representative sample
of over 700 congressional candidate Web sites over three election cycles (2002, 2004, and
2006). We link these data with television advertising data to assess the extent to which
candidates may favor the Web over television as the venue for their attacks. This enables us
to test the normalization hypothesis that behavior on the Web largely mimics that found in
more traditional media.
We find, despite the opportunities provided by the Web and recent claims of relatively
high levels of online negativity, that candidates go negative with similar likelihoods across
these media. Moreover, the same basic variables determine whether a candidate goes negative on the Internet and/or in their television ads. These findings support the normalization
prediction. There is a twist, however: our representative Internet data reveal some dynamics
that are missed when relying on the truncated sample of candidates who produce television
ads (i.e., well-funded, competitive candidates). This accentuates the advantages of using
Web site data to study candidate behavior.
We begin in the next section by offering a basic theory of negativity, including a discussion of how the particular media (i.e., television or the Web) might affect the decision to go
negative. We then describe our data, which come from a survey of campaign Web site
operators, Web site content analyses, and television advertising data from the Wisconsin
Advertising Project (see http://wiscadproject.wisc.edu). We follow with a comparative analysis of the trends and determinants of negativity. We conclude with a brief discussion of our
findings and their implications, including comments on how the Web offers researchers a
unique opportunity to study campaign communication strategies.

Negative Campaigning
Over the last decade, political communication researchers have devoted considerable
attention to the causes and effects of negative campaigns (e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar,
1995; Lau & Pomper, 2004; Kahn & Kenney, 2004; Geer, 2006; Mark, 2006; Buell &
Sigelman, 2008; Lau & Rovner, 2009). We focus on the extent to which candidates go
negative and the conditions under which they do so. We next build on a set of widely
agreed upon premises to deduce hypotheses about when a candidate will go negative, in
general. We then consider how the Internet, in particular, might affect candidates’ tendencies toward negativity.
Our first premise comes from a half-century of voting research that demonstrates that,
in most circumstances, voters pay scant attention to campaign rhetoric and base their decisions on a subset of accessible considerations (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Zaller, 1992;
Kinder, 1998). Second, in congressional elections, incumbency serves as a highly accessible
basis of vote choice. In fact, “incumbency is a dominant consideration” (Jacobson, 2004,
p. 23) as voters commonly treat congressional races as a referendum on the incumbent
(e.g., Mondak, 1995, p. 1045; Herrnson, 2008, pp. 198–201, 246).1 Third, all else
constant, voters favor incumbents (Gronke, 2000, pp. 140–141). This manifests itself in
the well-known benefit from incumbency that provides incumbents with up to a 10
percentage point advantage (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2004, p. 487; Abramowitz,
Alexander, & Gunning, 2006). These three assumptions imply that candidates who are not
advantaged (i.e., challengers) have an incentive to (a) induce voters to attend to their campaign rhetoric and (b) use the rhetoric to cause voters to base their decisions on criteria
other than incumbency.2 An additional premise, based on psychological research, is that
negativity motivates voters to attend to rhetoric (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000;
Druckman & McDermott, 2008).
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It follows that, compared to incumbents, challengers will be significantly more likely
to use negative rhetoric, with the hope of inducing voters to attend to their messages (also
see Skaperdas & Grofman, 1995; Theilmann & Wilhite, 1998; Kahn & Kenney, 1999,
2004; Herrnson, 2008, p. 217). Consistent with this prediction is the idea that advantaged
incumbents avoid active advocacy (for fear of appearing insecure about the campaign).
Jacobson (2004) explains that “inept, obscure, or underfinanced opponents can be dealt
with via routine maintenance of ties with groups in the electoral coalition, and they can
otherwise be ignored. . . . Ignoring the opposition is a standard tactic of incumbents who
feel relatively secure” (p. 97; also see Trent & Friedenberg, 2008, p. 100).
A final assumption (and caveat to our third premise above) is that the incumbency
advantage declines as the race becomes increasingly competitive. In competitive races,
voters are more likely to attend to campaign rhetoric and incorporate alternative types of
information (beyond incumbency; e.g., Kahn & Kenney, 1999, pp. 182–183). Incumbents
in competitive races thus have little choice but to enter the fray and attempt to persuade
voters. As a result, incumbents will often invoke negativity to induce voters to attend to
their preferred rhetoric (rather than the challengers’). In response, challengers may be
even more apt to go negative to counter incumbent rhetoric. Two predictions follow: As
competition increases, the occurrence of negativity will increase, and as competition
increases, the aforementioned challenger–incumbency disparity in going negative will
shrink and/or disappear (also see Kahn & Kenney, 2004, p. 36).3
Beyond our theory’s focus on candidate status, competition, and their interaction,
other factors have been posited to increase negative campaigning, including resources
(i.e., funds) (e.g., Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Lau & Pomper, 2001, 2004), candidate and/or
district partisanship (Lau & Pomper, 2001, 2004; Peterson & Djupe, 2005), candidate gender (Kahn & Kenney, 2004, p. 36; Lau & Pomper, 2004, pp. 32–33), office (i.e., House or
Senate) (Franz, Freedman, Goldstein, & Ridout, 2008), and whether the opponent goes
negative (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995, p. 120; Haynes & Rhine, 1998; Lau & Pomper,
2001, 2004; Kahn & Kenney, 1999). Since several of these factors correlate with candidate status and competition, analyses of the determinants of negativity need to incorporate
(i.e., control for) these variables.
Negativity on the Internet
How might the Internet affect candidates’ tendencies toward negativity? Does the medium
influence their decision about going negative? These questions reflect an ongoing debate
about whether behavior on new media matches or differs from that found in more
traditional media. The innovation hypothesis posits differences, suggesting that online
campaigning is “more disengaged from typical offline patterns of electioneering”
(Schweitzer, 2008, p. 450). In contrast, the normalization hypothesis suggests that “political practice on the Internet . . . closely resemble[s] politics offline and that traditional factors affecting the distribution of political resources . . . shape the way that political actors
use the Web” (Foot & Schneider, 2006, p. 169; also see Margolis & Resnick, 2000;
Graber, 2001, p. 110).
Most extant work on negative campaigning, including our above theory, provides little insight into innovation versus normalization. Indeed, it ignores media differences and
implicitly assumes that candidates aim their strategies at voters in general (e.g., the
median voter). This may be a problematic assumption for candidate Web sites. Engaged
supporters visit candidates’ Web sites with much greater frequency than other voters, and as
a result, may serve as the sites’ primary targets (e.g., Bimber & Davis, 2003, pp. 101–124;
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Cornfield, 2004; Foot & Schneider, 2006).4 This, in turn, might induce candidates to be
more apt to go negative online since attacks are less likely to alienate supporters
(compared to voters in general). Moreover, online negativity may stimulate supporters to
participate (e.g., Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998), volunteer (e.g., Hansen, 1985), and
donate funds (e.g., Miller, Krosnick, Holbrook, & Lowe, 2007). Trent and Friedenberg
(2008) argue that “websites are not constructed primarily for undecided voters or voters
who are strictly seeking information. . . . [Sites are designed to] influence a different set of
decisions: whether to volunteer, whether to donate, whether to vote or stay at home”
(p. 403; also see Bimber & Davis, 2003, p. 67).5
In line with this logic, numerous analysts predict that the likelihood of negativity will
be higher online than in other media (i.e., television). Some have even proclaimed that
“attack politics has hit the Web in a major way” (Thornburg & White, 2000, p. 1; also see,
e.g., Klotz, 2003; Wicks & Souley, 2003; Chadwick, 2006, pp. 155–156, Kaid, 2006,
pp. 71–72; Warnick, 2007, p. 87; Trent & Friedenberg, 2008, p. 404). The different cost/
benefit calculations of going negative online also might mean that the determinants of
online negativity differ from those found in other media. The advantageous cost/benefit
structure of online negativity might compel all sorts of candidates to go negative, regardless of their status and the competitiveness of the race. For these reasons, then, we may see
differences between the Web and other media such as television. We now turn to empirically examining if this is, in fact, the case.

Our Approach
We explore negativity online with data from three different sources. We use information
from a survey of congressional campaign Web site operators to get a sense of how campaigns view their Web site audiences. We then investigate patterns of online negativity
with a novel content analysis of over 700 House and Senate Web sites from 2002, 2004,
and 2006.6 To compare negativity across media, we link our Web site data to television
advertising data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project.7
Survey of Web Site Designers
As explained, underlying the expectation of relatively more online negativity is the
premise that Web sites target engaged supporters so as to recruit volunteers, garner donations, and mobilize participation. We tested the veracity of this assumption by conducting
a survey of individuals involved in the design of congressional campaign Web sites during
the 2008 campaign (N = 137). We identified potential respondents by assessing the universe of U.S. Senate and House campaign Web sites in 2008. We contacted the 716 campaigns that provided workable e-mail addresses or online inquiry forms, up to three times
during the course of the campaign (from October 17 to November 5). We asked that an
individual involved in the creation and/or updating of the campaign’s Web site complete a
confidential 5-minute online survey.8 We received a total of 137 responses (a 19.13%
response rate, which falls within the typical range; see Couper, 2008, p. 340). The sample
reflects the population fairly well in terms of office (14% Senate), party (53% Democrat),
and status (31% incumbents, 53% challengers, 15% open seats).
To ensure that we received responses from appropriate individuals, we asked respondents, on a 7-point scale, to indicate the extent to which they are informed about how the
content of the site is determined, with higher scores indicating more knowledge. The average response was 6.51 (SD = 1.16; N = 136). The survey also asked respondents to rate the
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priority of several groups of voters (e.g., undecided voters, supporters), in terms of each
being a target audience of the Web site, on a 7-point scale, with higher scores indicating
increased priority. Respondents used a similar scale to rate their perception of how often
an average member of each group (e.g., undecided voters, supporters) visited the site, with
higher scores indicating more frequent visits. Finally, we asked respondents to rate, again
with a 7-point scale, the importance of various goals for the site, such as “persuading
undecided voters” and “fundraising.”
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Web Site Data
We began our Web site data collection for each year—2002, 2004, and 2006—using the
National Journal, Congressional Quarterly, and various national and state party homepages to identify all Democratic and Republican House and Senate candidates.9 We
included the universe of Senatorial candidates and then selected a systematic random
sample of approximately 20% of House races, stratified by state and district to ensure
regional diversity in the sample. We searched for the candidates’ Web sites in our sample
by following links from the National Journal’s Web site (www.nationaljournal.com) and
using search engines such as Google. We were careful to identify only candidates’
personal campaign Web sites, excluding official congressional Web sites and Web sites
sponsored by other groups or individuals. We were able to identify almost all Senate
candidate Web sites and nearly 95% of House sites in our sample. This suggests that while
not all candidates had Web sites, clearly the overwhelming majority did, substantially
outnumbering candidates who produced television advertisements (see Foot & Schneider,
2006, pp. 7–11). Our sample consists of a total of 736 Web sites, with 26% coming from
Senate candidates and 74% coming from House contenders.10
In each year, we assembled a team of content analyzers. All coders participated in a
detailed training session that included practice coding before being randomly assigned a
set of candidate Web sites. All coding was conducted in the 10 days preceding election
day; however, we also tracked a small sample of Web sites from after Labor Day until
election day, and found little evidence of changes that would have significantly altered our
coding (i.e., changes almost always concerned items such as the candidate’s schedule).
For the years in our sample, we thus believe our coding approach successfully captured
campaign strategy.
Coders examined all major parts of the candidate’s self-contained Web site for evidence of negativity. That is, they searched the homepage, the fundraising area, the issues
area, the biography area, and any other major area linked to the homepage (e.g., news
room and media pages) to find material about the candidate’s opponent that was negative
or critical—either in tone or explicitly. Our approach follows Geer’s (2006) depiction that
“negativity is any criticism leveled by one candidate against another during a campaign”
(p. 23; also see Buell & Sigelman, 2008).
We opted for a dichotomous measure of negativity, rather than a count across the
entire Web site, for two reasons. First, on a particular page, we found it highly unreliable
to count the number of negative statements (when does a negative statement end and
another one begin?). Second, using a subsample of 41 sites, we counted the number of distinct pages (e.g., front page, personal page, issue page) that included negativity. We found
very little variance such that most candidates who went negative on their sites did so twice
(most typically, on the front page and issues page; also see, e.g., Klotz, 1998, 2003).11 Not
surprisingly, then, we find virtually identical results, in our subsample, when using this
count or employing our simpler and more reliable dichotomous indicator.12 We do
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acknowledge that counts of entire sites may become increasingly important in future years
as the sites become more complex; yet, we believe our approach for 2002–2006 is meaningful and valid.13

For each candidate in our Web site sample, we obtained data—from the Wisconsin Advertising Project—on whether the candidate produced one or more television advertisements
and the tone of the ad(s). Of particular interest is whether a given advertisement was coded
as “attacking” the opponent (see Franz et al., 2008, pp. 56–57, who similarly operationalize
negative ads as attack ads). To ensure comparability with our negativity measure, we created a variable indicating whether each candidate created at least one negative ad. The
results reported below are similar if we instead used the proportion of a candidate’s ads that
are negative and, thus, we opt for the comparable dichotomous measure, which facilitates
comparisons. The television advertising data were available only for 2002 and 2004.14

Results
We present our results in three sections. We start with information from the campaign
Web site operator survey. We then present our comparative analysis of the frequency of
negativity. Finally, we report results about the determinants of negativity.
Campaign Web Site Audience and Objectives
Results from our survey of campaign Web site operators show that campaigns typically
design their sites for a general audience, although they recognize that supporters are the
most likely to visit. The results, which we present in Figure 1, show that those involved in
the creation of the sites view “voters in general” and “undecided voters” as the primary
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target audiences. These two groups register significantly greater priority scores (on our
7-point scale) than all other groups (e.g., comparing “undecided voters” to “journalists”
gives t123 = 3.86, p < .01, for a two-tailed test). This matches Stromer-Galley, Howard,
Schneider, and Foot’s (2003) survey of Web site producers, implemented in 2002–2003,
which also finds “undecided voters” to be the top-rated audience.
Interestingly, the respondents recognize that “voters in general” and “undecided
voters” visit less frequently than all other groups. Instead, they believe “highly engaged
voters” access the site most often, even though these voters are not the primary target of
the site (e.g., comparing the frequency question for “highly engaged voters” to “undecided
voters” gives t112 = 8.97, p < .01, for a two-tailed test). This accentuates the importance of
not confounding the frequency with which particular voters visit Web sites with the intentions of those designing the sites (e.g., certain groups may be more important even if they
visit less often; cf. Trent & Friedenberg, 2008, pp. 402–404).15
As mentioned, we asked respondents to rate the importance of various goals for the
site using a 7-point scale with higher scores indicating increased importance. The results,
displayed in Figure 2, show that the sites are created, first and foremost, to inform and
persuade voters, with fundraising, volunteer recruitment, and mobilization (i.e., getting
out the vote) being significantly less important (e.g., comparing “persuading undecided
voters” to “fundraising” gives t115 = 2.98, p < .01, for a two-tailed test).16 This again mimics the results from Stromer-Galley et al.’s (2003) survey, which reported even larger
differences between providing information and volunteering and fundraising (also see
Klotz, 2003, p. 76; Foot & Schneider, 2006, p. 170). In sum, campaigns do not appear to
primarily use their Web sites as a tool for targeting supporters to volunteer or donate.
These results call into question the expectation of increased online negativity, since, as
mentioned, an underlying premise of the prediction concerns the primacy of targeting supporters to benefit from the Web’s opportunities for fundraising, volunteer recruitment, and
mobilization.17 Instead, it appears that candidates see their Web sites as a medium for
communicating with voters in general, much like other media. This evidence, then, is
more consistent with the aforementioned normalization hypothesis (rather than the innovation hypothesis). We now turn to our direct examination of campaign negativity.

7
7-point scale (std. dev.)
(towards increased importance)
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Negativity on the Web and in Television Ads
We begin by comparing our Web site and television advertising samples. Since virtually all candidates launch Web sites, our Web sample closely mimics the full population of campaigns.18 This is not the case for television advertisements, which tend to be
produced only by well-funded candidates in close races. We find that 47.75% (212 of 444)
of the candidates in our 2002 and 2004 Web site sample did not produce a single television advertisement (at least as available from the Wisconsin project).19 Moreover, the television advertising sample is highly skewed toward more competitive Senate races. For
example, whereas 68% of the candidates in our Web site sample participated in the least
competitive races—as classified by Cook’s nonpartisan ratings (see Notes 18 and 23)—
only 47% of candidates with television advertisements did so. Similarly, as noted, 26% of
our Web site sample comes from Senate candidates, whereas nearly 40% of the television
advertising sample comes from the Senate. As we will later discuss, the underrepresentation of less competitive and House races in the television sample truncates variation on
chamber and competitiveness measures. (We base all subsequent television advertisement
analyses on the sample of candidates who produced at least one ad.)
Despite these differences in samples, when we turn to direct comparisons of the negativity across media, we see very similar likelihoods of going negative. Forty-eight percent
(351 of 732)20 of candidates went negative on the Web, compared to 55% in their television advertisements (128 of 232). Candidates thus are not more likely to go negative on
the Web and, in fact, are slightly more likely to go negative on television (a difference of
proportions test gives z = 1.86, p < .10, for a two-tailed test). While the greater negativity
in advertisements may stem from overrepresentation of competitive races in the television
sample, there is still no clear evidence that candidates are aggressively using the opportunities provided by the Web to attack their opponents.
We also observe similar over-time trends toward negativity in both media, with the
likelihood of negativity increasing on the Web—in 2002, 2004, and 2006—from 38% to
45% to 57%, and in television advertising—in 2002 and 2004—from 51% to 59%.
Finally, in both media, Senate candidates are more likely to go negative; the respective
Senate and House percentages for the Web are 60% (114 of 191) and 44% (237 of
541) (z = 3.78, p < .01, for a two-tailed test), and the television percentages are 61% (56
of 92) and 51% (72 of 140) (z = 1.42, p < .20, for a two-tailed test). That the chamber comparisons only significantly differ for the Web may, again, stem from the competitiveness
and Senate skew in the television sample. Overall, these trends suggest similarities across
media, as the normalization hypothesis predicts.21

Determinants of Going Negative
The evidence thus far suggests, consistent with the normalization hypotheses, that candidates are not more likely—and are in fact slightly less likely—to go negative on the Web
than in television advertising. We next explore whether the determinants of negativity also
cohere across media, as we would expect given that campaigns seem to view their Web sites
as a venue for communicating with voters in general. We also test our hypotheses that competition engenders negativity, challengers are significantly more likely to go negative, and
the challenger-incumbency distinction diminishes as competitiveness increases. To do this,
for each of these media, we regress negativity on candidate status and competition, and then
we add interactions between the two. As mentioned, we also need to include control
variables posited in other work (e.g., Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Lau & Pomper, 2004).22
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We use dichotomous variables to identify challengers, open-seat candidates, Senate
candidates (as opposed to House candidates), the candidate’s political party (i.e., if the
candidate is a Democrat), and gender (i.e., if the candidate is a woman). We also include
dummy variables for year (i.e., 2004 or 2006), since we found evidence of a trend toward
negativity. To measure competitiveness, we use the aforementioned ratings by nonpartisan political analyst Charlie Cook, where higher scores on the 4-point scale indicate
increased competitiveness.23 We also include measures of campaign resources, the per
capita amount of money each candidate raised (in millions of dollars) as reported by the
Federal Election Commission, and “district partisanship,” which is the percentage of
votes in the district (or state) cast for George W. Bush in 2000 (for our 2002 and 2004
data) or 2004 (for our 2006 data) (Lau & Pomper, 2004).24 Finally, we created a dummy
variable to identify candidates whose opponent went negative in the given medium since
candidates might respond to one another (or uniformly respond to district demands) (e.g.,
Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Lau & Pomper, 2004).25 We standardized all variables on
a 0 to 1 scale.26
We present the results in Table 1. The first two columns offer strong support for our
competition and challenger hypotheses for both the Web and television advertising data.
In both cases, the variables are highly significant and substantively meaningful (also see
Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Franz et al., 2008, p. 57). In the least competitive races on the
Web, the (average) likelihood of going negative is .37 (SE = .03); this increases at each
level of competitiveness, respectively, to .52 (.03), .67 (.04), and .79 (.04).27 The
analogous television ad probabilities are .52 (.06), .58 (.04), .64 (.05), and .70 (.08).28 The
challenger effect is evident on the Web such that the average challenger has a .82
probability (.03) of going negative, compared to .20 (.03) for the average incumbent. On
television, these probabilities are .73 (.06) and .40 (.06).
The effects of the other variables are quite similar across media: negativity
increases with open-seat candidates, year, female candidates, and funds raised.29 There
are, however, three notable differences. First, candidate partisanship, for reasons that
are not entirely clear to us, differs, with Democrats being more likely to go negative on
the Web but less likely to do so on television. Second, opponent negativity triggers a
response only for television advertising, possibly reflecting the greater reach of television and the need to respond. Third, Senate candidates exhibit a greater likelihood than
House candidates of going negative on the Web (with respective predicted probabilities of .59 [.05] and .44 [.03]), but this is not the case in television ads (with respective
predicted probabilities of .61 [.06] and .57 [.05]). The lack of the Senate television
effect likely stems from the aforementioned sample bias (and not necessarily pure
media differences). In short, chamber differences in campaign styles likely differ
across the full population of campaigns, but this fails to surface with the truncated television sample.30
The last two columns of Table 1 add interactions between competition and the candidate status variables. The Web results support our hypothesis that the challenger–incumbent
differential in negativity declines as the race becomes more competitive (as indicated by
the significant interaction). However, this is not evident in the television data, as the
interaction is insignificant (cf. Kahn & Kenney, 1999, p. 94). The truncated television
sample—with few noncompetitive candidates producing ads—may again lie behind this
non-effect (although see Note 32). The Web sample results suggest the existence of two
distinct political universes: a noncompetitive one in which challengers’ and incumbents’
behaviors are different and a competitive one where their behaviors resemble one another.
Interestingly, the significant interaction between competition and open-seat status
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Table 1
Determinants of negative campaigning
Models without interactions
Independent variable
Challenger
Open seat
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Competition
Democrat
Funds
Female
Senate
District partisanship (Rep.)
Opponent negative
2004
2006

Web
2.90***
(0.26)
0.94***
(0.30)
1.86***
(0.32)
0.46***
(0.19)
4.74***
(1.91)
0.41**
(0.25)
0.60***
(0.22)
−0.14
(0.65)
−0.02
(0.24)
0.61***
(0.26)
1.10***
(0.26)

TV
1.41***
(0.42)
1.23***
(0.46)
0.79*
(0.50)
−0.47*
(0.33)
6.62**
(3.90)
0.61*
(0.48)
0.16
(0.36)
−0.66
(1.63)
1.33***
(0.34)
0.49*
(0.35)

Competition × Open seat
Competition × Challenger
Constant
Log-likelihood
Number of observations

−3.17***
(0.52)
−346.25
714

−1.61
(1.28)
−114.72
205

Models with interactions
Web
3.41***
(0.31)
1.84***
(0.41)
3.15***
(0.47)
0.53***
(0.20)
4.60***
(1.99)
0.34*
(0.26)
0.67***
(0.23)
−0.09
(0.68)
0.03
(0.24)
0.56**
(0.26)
1.04***
(0.26)
−2.35***
(0.69)
−2.56***
(0.68)
−3.58***
(0.55)
−337.14
714

TV
1.77***
(0.54)
0.98*
(0.68)
1.03*
(0.74)
−0.45*
(0.33)
7.52**
(4.02)
0.53
(0.48)
0.16
(0.36)
−0.74
(1.64)
1.33***
(0.34)
0.46*
(0.35)

0.33
(1.15)
−1.10
(1.09)
−1.68*
(1.30)
−113.92
205

Note. The dependent variable was negative campaigning (0 = no negativity, 1 = negativity).
Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (one-tailed).

suggests that open-seat candidates might behave similarly to challengers (for further
discussion, see Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2009).
The Web–television differences are intriguing on two counts.31 First, they suggest
some small media differences, particularly with regard to opponent response.32 Second,
they reveal the limits of using a television sample skewed toward the Senate and competitive races. That said, the overall message of our results is that candidates go negative
online with similar likelihoods and under analogous conditions as they do in their television advertisements (e.g., as predicted by the normalization hypothesis).33
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Conclusion
While journalists, pundits, and scholars have spent a substantial amount of time discussing
and debating the role of the Web in political campaigns, few systematic analyses of how
the Web is used exist. We addressed this gap by offering an extensive analysis of negativity on
a representative sample of congressional candidate Web sites over three election cycles.
Thus, we offer the most updated and comprehensive analysis of online negativity and, as
far as we know, the first comparison with television ads.
Our results show that while candidates frequently go negative online, they do so with
similar likelihoods to going negative in their television ads. We find further support for the
normalization hypothesis both in terms of trends and determinants, albeit with a few
differences—most notably the differences in opponent response on television and Democrats being more negative on the Web. Overall, our results show that candidates see their
Web sites as targeting the general voting population and thus need to be motivated by their
political situation (e.g., challenger, competitive race) before going negative. That behavior
on the Web largely mimics that found on television is intriguing given the tremendous
amount of speculation about how the Web will change politics. Of course, other types of
changes are possible, although we would submit that, to date, there is scant evidence of
dramatic changes (see, e.g., Druckman et al., 2007, 2009). The implication is that analysts
should take caution in asserting that the Internet has transformed politics, at least until systematic evidence exists.
Our analysis also highlights the potential benefit of the Web for studying campaign
behavior. Unlike television ads that typically only capture competitive and well-funded
campaigns, Web sites exist for virtually all Senate and House candidates. Consequently,
researchers can study campaign strategy using a representative sample of competitive and
noncompetitive races, and do so using an unmediated and holistic (e.g., candidates can
post copious information on their sites) picture of the campaign. Thus, one of the Web’s
most important contributions may come from how it changes the way scholars study
campaign behavior.

Notes
1. Jacobson (2004) adds, “Nearly everything pertaining to candidates and campaigns for
Congress is profoundly influenced by whether the candidate is an incumbent” (p. 23).
2. The motivation to engage voters in more deliberative decision making may also apply to
other traditionally disadvantaged candidates such as those who are female, underfunded, and/or
represent the minority party in their district. We focus on candidate status (e.g., incumbent, challenger) because it remains the primary determinant of advantage/disadvantage in congressional
campaigns (see, e.g., Jacobson, 2004, p. 23; Herrnson, 2008, p. 246).
3. The behavior of open-seat candidates likely depends on other factors (see Jacobson, 2004,
pp. 98–99), including the candidate’s ability to tie him- or herself to the incumbent, district partisanship, and the candidate’s standing in the race.
4. But see Goldstein (2004) on targeting with television advertising.
5. Web sites, in contrast to television ads, also provide virtually limitless space to attack without having to sacrifice other parts of a candidate’s message.
6. While ours is not the first content analysis of negativity on congressional Web sites, it is, to
the best of our knowledge, the only data set that includes campaigns post-2002, which is often cited
as the year in which “e-campaigning . . . entered a new phase. While the Web was once the province
of the cybersavvy politico, it is now a critical part of any candidate’s strategy” (Chinni, 2002, p. 1;
also see Foot & Schneider, 2006, p. 10). Earlier content analyses of negativity on congressional
campaign Web sites include Davis’s (1999) study of 1996 Web sites and Kamarck’s (1999) study of
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1998 sites, both of which report modest levels of negativity. Klotz (1998, 2003) analyzes Senate
candidate Web sites from 1996 through 2002; he finds a substantial rise in negativity over this time
period. (None of these studies include comparisons with television advertising or examinations of
the determinants of negativity.) Of related interest are Wicks and Souley’s (2003) study of negative
news releases on presidential candidate Web sites in 2000, Schweitzer’s (2008) study of German
party Web sites (also see Schweitzer, 2009, who focuses on negativity), Foot and Schneider’s (2006)
general analyses of candidate Web sites, and Ward, Owen, Davis, and Taras’s (2008) cross-national
analyses of election Web sites.
7. Others have explored negativity in television advertising, including Kahn and Kenney (1999,
2004) and Franz, Freedman, Goldstein, and Ridout (2008). We are not aware of any prior work,
however, that engages in comparative analyses. Also, Lau and Pomper (2004) investigate negativity
in Senate campaigns with campaign statements contained in newspapers (also see Sigelman &
Buell, 2003). The main downside of this approach concerns the use of a mediated source (e.g.,
Lapinski, 2004, p. 10).
8. We thank Jennifer Stromer-Galley for advice (see Stromer-Galley, Howard, Schneider, &
Foot, 2003; Foot & Schneider, 2006, p. 225).
9. Our sample includes independent Bernard Sanders of Vermont, who was a 2002 House
incumbent and 2006 open-seat Senate candidate. We also included incumbent Democrat turned
Independent Democrat Joe Lieberman in 2006.
10. The list of all sites coded is available from the authors.
11. In our subsample, the average number of negative statements, across the Web site, is 2.07
with a standard deviation of .46.
12. We also investigated the effect of overall Web site size by accounting for the number of
pages on each candidate’s Web site. The Web site size variable did not significantly relate to the
likelihood of going negative, and it was not significant in any of the analyses reported below.
13. To assess the reliability of the coding, we randomly sampled approximately 30% of the
sites and had one of two reliability coders recode them. We found a very high reliability level of
above .90 (adjusting for chance agreement) for our negativity measure (see Riffe, Lacy, & Fico,
1998, p. 131; Neuendorf, 2002, p. 143).
14. In 2006, the project only coded a small subset of campaigns in the Midwest, and these data
are not publicly available (personal communication, Wisconsin Advertising Project, January 27,
2009).
15. The importance of “journalists” is interesting since they often visit the site to obtain information that they then use in writing stories that reach broad audiences (e.g., Bimber & Davis, 2003,
pp. 68–72; Semiatin, 2005, pp. 166–167).
16. We asked respondents to rate a few other goals as well, but none of these registered high
scores. These included things like publishing campaign events and distributing campaign material.
Details are available from the authors.
17. The year of our survey (2008) does not match the years of our Web site data (2002, 2004,
2006). However, we take comfort in the consistency of our survey results with Stromer-Galley,
Howard, Schneider, and Foot’s (2003) 2002–2003 survey.
18. Since we take a near census of Senate campaigns (e.g., excluding only the few candidates
who did not have sites), this part of our sample almost perfectly matches the population in terms of
incumbency and competitiveness. Our House sample contains 46% incumbents, 43% challengers,
and 12% open-seat candidates, which mimics the respective population totals of 49%, 40.5%, and
10.5%. In terms of competitiveness—according to Cook’s nonpartisan ratings (www.cookpolitical.com)—our House sample ended up slightly overrepresenting toss-up campaigns, with 9% being
toss-up, 18% being leaning or likely, and 73% being solidly in favor of one candidate, compared to
respective population figures of 5%, 14%, and 81%. The small overrepresentation of competitive
races stems, in part, from our regional stratification that inadvertently resulted in multiple races from
some states with relatively few congressional districts that happen to regularly be competitive (e.g.,
New Mexico). It also stems slightly from us retaining some districts in our sample in each election
cycle so as to allow researchers to follow candidates over time.
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19. It is important to note that the Wisconsin project does not monitor the full universe of media
markets (i.e., it is restricted to the 100 largest markets, which include 86% of viewing households;
Franz, Freedman, Goldstein, & Ridout, 2008, p. 47). Thus, it is plausible that some candidates in our
Web site sample produced ads that simply were not picked up by the Wisconsin project (as they fall
out of the project’s sample of markets) and thus were excluded from our calculations.
20. Coders failed to classify four Web sites.
21. If we rerun our Web data on the subsample of campaigns that produce an ad, the results are
similar. Specifically, with that sample, 46% of candidates went negative overall, 41% did so in
2002, 49% did so in 2004, 51% in the Senate did so, and 42% in the House did so.
22. Unless otherwise noted, our data come from The Almanac of American Politics, complemented by the National Journal’s Web site.
23. Specifically, the 4-point scale is coded such that 0 equals solid Democratic or Republican, 1
represents likely Democratic or Republican, 2 equals leaning Democratic or Republican, and 3
equals a toss-up. The Cook scores are a common measure of competitiveness (e.g., Sulkin, 2001;
Goldstein & Freedman, 2002) and have the virtue of being largely exogenous to the race itself (e.g.,
Gronke, 2000, pp. 100–101).
24. Prior work, particularly when focused on presidential campaigns, often includes a variable
indicating whether the candidate is a front-runner (e.g., Skaperdas & Grofman, 1995; Buell &
Sigelman, 2008). However, we do not include it because, in congressional elections, it so highly
correlates with incumbency status (leading to extreme multicollinearity). Indeed, computing frontrunner status based on vote totals yields a correlation with incumbency of .78 (p < .01). A regression
of front-runner status on the other independent variables results in an R2 of nearly .8.
25. Inclusion of the opponent’s negativity variable creates an endogeneity issue. Lau and
Pomper (2004, pp. 146–147), in their newspaper analyses of Senate candidates, address this by using
two-stage least squares. Their key instruments are negative campaigning by the opposite party candidate in the prior election and the polling firm and media consultant working for each candidate.
Unfortunately, data on polling firm and media consultants are not readily available for the years of
our data. We also do not have access to prior election data (e.g., from 2000 or for several years in the
case of our House sample, since not all districts were in the sample every year). Moreover, while the
use of an instrument is statistically preferable—if strong instruments can be found (which we were
not able to do)—it does not allow one to determine whether significance of the opponent variable
reflects actual responsiveness to the opponent or both candidates responding to district/state
demands (Kahn & Kenney, 1999, also do not use two-stage least squares, and Franz, Freedman,
Goldstein, & Ridout, 2008, exclude the opponent negativity variable entirely). Despite these issues,
we include the opponent negativity variable in our models given its prominence in past work (see,
e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Lau & Pomper, 2001, 2004; Kahn & Kenney, 1999).
26. We use one-tailed tests since our main predictions, as well as those from prior work (e.g.,
our control variables), have clear directional content (Blalock, 1979, p. 163).
27. We compute these and other probabilities using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 1999).
We set all other variables to their mean values.
28. The one notable difference when we run the television analyses with a proportional dependent variable (i.e., proportion of negative ads) instead of a dichotomous one is that, with the proportional data, we do not find a significant competition main effect. We suspect this stems from the lack
of variance on competition in the television sample.
29. We examined the Web data separately for each year and found two significant year interactions, with 2004 interacting with party identification (i.e., Democrat is not significant in 2004) and
district partisanship (Republican districts are significantly less negative in 2004). The results suggest
that minority party status (i.e., Democratic) might only matter in midterm election years since,
during presidential election years, the partisan status of Congress is often a secondary consideration
in a voter’s mind relative to the presidential vote. Instead, minority party status is replaced by the
extent to which the district opposes the more recognizable incumbent president.
30. If we rerun our Web data on the subsample of campaigns that produced an ad, the Senate
effect falls to insignificance (but the positive Democrat effect remains).
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31. Further analysis reveals that 32% (73 of 229) of the candidates did not go negative on either
of the media, 13% (30 of 229) went negative on their Web sites but not in their television ads, 22%
(51 of 229) went negative only on television (and not on their Web sites), and 33% (75 of 229) went
negative on both. Thus, a majority of the candidates make the same decisions across media. We
explored what might lead a candidate to go negative in one medium and not the other; the results
mimic what we report in general (e.g., Democrats were more likely to go negative only online, and
candidates who only went negative on television responded strongly to their opponents).
32. Given the aforementioned endogeneity issues with the opponent negativity measure, we
reran our analyses excluding the variable. The Web results remain unchanged. The television ad
results change slightly, with Democrat and female becoming insignificant (in both models) and the
competition-challenger interaction becoming marginally significant. Also, if we rerun our analyses
excluding candidates who are in the sample multiple times (e.g., in multiple years), our main results
are unchanged.
33. We also investigated trends and determinants in policy-focused and personal-focused
negativity on the Web. The results, which are available from the authors, mimic what we find with overall negativity with regard to our key variables of challenger status, open seats, and competitiveness.
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